A key challenge facing the design of differentially private systems in the non-interactive setting is to maintain the utility of the released data for general analytics applications. To overcome this challenge, we propose the PCA-Gauss system that leverages the novel combination of dimensionality reduction and generative model for synthesizing differentially private data.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an era of big data and machine learning, the digital society is generating a considerable amount of personal data at every moment. These data can be sensitive, and as a result, significant privacy concerns arise. Even with the use of anonymization mechanisms, privacy leakage can still occur, as exemplified by Narayanan et al. [68] , Calandrino et al. [18] , Barbaro and Zeller [7] , Haeberlen et al. [42] , and Backes et al. [5] . These privacy leaks have motivated the design of formal privacy guarantees. To this end, differential privacy has become the gold standard for a rigorous privacy guarantee [14] , [28] - [31] . Many mechanisms have been proposed to comply with differential privacy guarantees [14] , [20] , [22] , [29] , [31] , [33] , [44] , [59] , [65] , [69] , [86] , and various implementations of differentially-private systems have been presented in the literature [3] , [13] , [35] , [36] , [40] , [61] , [81] , [82] , [87] .
There are two settings under differential privacy -interactive and non-interactive [28] . Among the two, as pointed out by Dwork et al. [32] and Bindschaedler et al. [9] , the noninteractive setting has traditionally been more challenging to implement due to the fact that the perturbation required is often too high for the published data to be truly useful. However, this setting is still attractive as there are incentives for the data collectors to release the data to seek outside expertise, e.g. the Netflix prize [1] , and OpenSNP [2] . Concurrently, there are incentives for researchers to obtain the data in their entirety as that would allow easier interaction between the algorithm and the data [9] . More specifically, in the current era when machine learning has become the ubiquitous tool in data analysis, non-interactive data release would allow virtually instant compatibility with existing machine learning algorithms. For these reasons, we aim to design a private noninteractive data release system, as opposed to the interactive setting.
In this work, we address the challenge faced by noninteractive private data release via a powerful machine learning technique -dimensionality reduction. We support this idea by providing theoretical analysis that demonstrates how reducing dimension of the data can yield quadratic reduction in the level of perturbation required for rigorous differential privacy guarantee. In addition, we explore the idea of coupling dimensionality reduction with a generative model to create a data synthesis system which preserves the strong -differential privacy while offering high utility of the data. Although both dimensionality reduction [12] , [52] , [55] , [60] , [86] , [93] and generative models [9] , [46] , [63] , [70] , [72] , [78] , [91] have been separately studied as a method for differentially-private data analysis, they have not been explored in conjunction with each other.
We propose the PCA-Gauss system consisting of two simple techniques -principal component analysis (PCA) and the Gaussian model. PCA is one of the most common dimensionality reduction technique in machine learning and is optimal under the least reconstruction error criterion [56] , [67] . The Gaussian model, meanwhile, serves as the generative model. This is a relatively new idea in the differentially-private data release framework, yet, the Gaussian model on its own is a century-old idea and is arguably the most well-known, extensively-studied, and widely-used model in probability and statistics. Due to its universality and historical importance, efficient implementation of the Gaussian sampler is virtually omnipresent [17] , [38] , [80] . Moreover, it has a theoretical essence in the form of the Central Limit Theorem [43] , which allows this simple model to effectively represent many natural data distributions.
Combining these two frameworks, we present three algo-arXiv:1709.00054v1 [cs.CR] 31 Aug 2017 rithms for PCA-Gauss that can be applied to a range of machine learning applications, including both unsupervised and supervised learning. We rigorously prove that these algorithms preserve the strong -differential privacy guarantee.
Moreover, to show the general applicability of our idea, we also extend the framework to employ the Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [10] , [67] . As a by-product of our analysis, we also propose a simple algorithm for PCA that preserves -differential privacy.
We evaluate our system on three large real-world datasets under three common machine learning applications -clustering, classification, and regression. We demonstrate that our method can significantly improve the utility performance by order of magnitude for a fixed privacy budget, when compared to five prior methods. More importantly, our method has small loss in utility when compared to the non-private real data.
Finally, we summarize our contribution as follows.
• We propose a novel system consisting of PCA and the Gaussian model (PCA-Gauss) that will be shown to be generally applicable for various data-analytic tasks with high utility, while preserving the strong -differential privacy. Furthermore, we extend this model to the more complex Gaussian Mixture Model.
• We present three algorithms to implement PCA-Gauss that cover both the unsupervised and supervised machine learning tasks. Unlike most of previous works, we diligently ensure the integrity of the training label when data are synthesized via our algorithms for supervised learning.
• We theoretically show that PCA-Gauss can be completely characterized by a closed-form equation. This consequently allows us to concisely and rigorously prove that all three of our algorithms satisfy the strong -differential privacy guarantee. As a by-product of our theoretical analysis, we propose an algorithm for PCA that guarantees -differential privacy (Lap-PCA).
• We evaluate our method on three real-world datasets on three common data analytic applications -clustering, classification, and regression. The experimental results show that, when compared to previous methods, our method can considerably enhance the utility performance by order of magnitude for a fixed privacy budget. Finally, compared to the non-private baseline of using real data, we show that PCA-Gauss incurs only a small loss in utility across all three machine learning tasks, validating the viability of our approach for practical deployment.
II. PRIOR WORKS
In this paper, we focus on the design of a non-interactive differentially-private data release system. Since our method involves a generative model and dimensionality reduction, we discuss relevant works under these frameworks here. To our knowledge, we are the first to combine these two concepts together for non-interactive private data release.
A. Generative Models for Differential Privacy
The concept of using generative models to provide differentially-private non-interactive data release can be classified into two groups according to Bowen and Liu [16] : non-parametric generative models, and parametric generative models.
1) Non-Parametric Generative Models: Primarily, these models rely on the differential privacy guarantee of the Exponential mechanism [65] , which defines a distribution to synthesize the data based on the input database and the pre-defined quality function. Various methods -both application-specific and application-independent -have been proposed [15] , [26] , [41] , [44] , [65] , [66] , [72] , [85] . Our approach contrasts these works in two ways. First, we consider a parametric generative model, and second, we augment our model with dimensionality reduction. We will experimentally compare our method to this class of models by implementing the non-parametric generative model based on Algorithm 1 in [15] by Blum et al.
2) Parametric Generative Models: Our method of using the Gaussian model, as well as the Gaussian Mixture Model, falls into this category. We aim at building a system that can be generally applied to various applications and data-types, i.e. application-independent system. However, many previous works on non-interactive private data release are applicationspecific or limited by the data-types they are compatible with. Thus we discuss these two types of parametric generative models separately. a) Application-Specific Parametric Generative Models: These models are designed for specific applications or datatypes. For example, the works by Sala et al. [78] and by Proserpio et al. [72] are for graph analysis, the system by Ororbia et al. [70] is for plaintext statistics, the analysis by Machanavajjhala et al. [63] is for commuting pattern analysis, the Binomial-Beta model by McClure and Reiter [64] and the Bayesian-network model by Zhang et al. [91] are for binary data. Consequently, the generality of these models is limited. In contrast, in this work, we aim at using a generative model that is universally applicable to various applications, i.e. application-independent. b) Application-Independent Parametric Generative Models: These generative models are less common, possibly due to the fact that releasing data for general analytics often requires a high-level of perturbation that impacts data utility. Bindschaedler et al. [9] design a system for plausible deniability, which can be extended to ( , δ)-differential privacy. In contrast, our work aims at providing the strictly stronger -differential privacy. Another previous method is MODIPS by Liu [62] , which applies statistical models based on the concept of sufficient statistics to capture the distribution of the data, and then synthesizes the data from the differentially-private sufficient statistics of the models. This general idea is, in fact, closely related to the Gaussian model employed in this work. However, there are two important distinctions. First, MODIPS requires the knowledge of the true distribution of the data, which can be implausible in practice. Second, and more importantly, MODIPS is not accompanied by dimensionality reduction, a step which will be shown to be very important in maintaining the utility of synthetic data. For comparison with our work, we implement MODIPS in our experiments by assuming that the data are Gaussian-distributed.
Application-independent models are relatively scarce compared to their counterpart likely due to the low utility of the released data. One key contribution of our work is to address this challenge via dimensionality reduction. We discuss the rationale of this idea in more detail in Section IV.
B. Dimensionality Reduction for Utility Enhancement
Traditionally, data partition and aggregation [22] , [26] , [44] , [45] , [47] , [48] , [58] , [69] , [72] - [74] , [88] , [90] , [92] have been applied to enhance data utility with respect to differential privacy. In contrast, our work explores an orthogonal approach via dimensionality reduction. Specifically, we explore the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is appropriate for the general-purpose private data release because it is optimal under the data reconstruction criterion (cf. [10] , [56] , [67] ).
1) PCA as a Dimensionality Reduction Technique:
In relation to previous works, although Jiang et al. [52] consider PCA for non-interactive private data release, their system uses the identity query, as opposed to the generative model in our work. We show via experiments in Section VIII that our use of the generative model yields significant improvements.
2) Other Dimensionality Reduction Techniques: Apart from PCA, a few other techniques have been proposed for performing dimensionality reduction. Jiang et al. [52] consider Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [37] , but LDA is limited to only binary classification, whereas our PCA-based system can be used with various machine learning tasks (cf. Section VIII). Xiao et al. [86] and Acs et al. [4] use wavelet transform and lossy Fourier transform, respectively, to compress the data, but both are similarly limited since they are designed specifically for the range-count, and/or histogram queries.
One existing technique that has been shown to be compatible with general-purpose private data release is via random projection. Blocki et al. [12] , Kenthapadi et al. [55] , and Zhou et al. [93] use a random matrix whose entries are i.i.d. Gaussian, whereas Li et al. [60] use i.i.d. Bernoulli noise. However, none of the previous random-projection methods couple dimensionality reduction with a generative model like we do. We will experimentally compare our work with two random-projection methods: (1) the method of Li et al. [60] , and (2) our custom adaptation of the method of Blocki et al. [12] in conjunction with the Gaussian model. The latter was not originally designed for non-interactive data release, but our in-house modification facilitates experimental comparison between random projection and PCA-Gauss.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we discuss important background concepts related to our work that facilitate the presentation of our system.
A. Database Notation
We consider a database with N entries (samples), each of which has M real-valued attributes (features) -although, it is notable that our approach is also compatible with categorical features since they can be converted to real values with encoding techniques [84] . With this setup, the database can be represented by a matrix X ∈ R M ×N , where the column vector x j refers to entry j in the database, and x(i) refers to attribute i. Thus, for notational purpose, we refer to the database as X. Furthermore, in our analysis, we assume that the database X is centered, i.e.
x i /N = 0. This can be achieved in practice simply by the matrix centering operation:
, where 1 is the vector of all 1's. Finally, we assume the feature values to be bounded by [−a, a], so we may write X ∈ [−a, a] M ×N to refer to the centered database in this case.
B. Differential Privacy
When dealing with high-dimensional data and vectorvalued or matrix-valued query functions, f (X), general metric spaces can be used to define sensitivity. However, as suggested by Dwork et al. [31] , the L 1 distance lends itself nicely to the Laplace mechanism. Thus, in our analysis, unless otherwise stated, sensitivity is defined according to the L 1 distance as:
Remark 1. In differential privacy, the notion of neighboring databases X, X can be considered in two related ways. The first is the unbounded notion when one entry is removed or added. The second is the bounded notion when values of one entry vary. The main difference is that the first assumes the size of the database N is publicly known, while the second assumes it to be private. However, the two concepts are closely related and a mechanism that satisfies one can also satisfy the other with a small cost, as illustrated in [15] . In this definition and analysis, for simplicity of our discussion and mathematical derivation, we adopt the latter notion throughout.
Definition 2.
A mechanism A on a query function f (·) is -differentially-private if for all pairs X, X ∈ R M ×N which differ in a single entry and for all possible measurable outputs S ⊆ R P ×V ,
There is also the ( , δ)-differential privacy [25] , [30] , which is a relaxation of this original definition. In short, ( , δ)-differential privacy guarantees,
In this paper, we focus primarily on the -differential privacy, although the ( , δ)-differential privacy will be referred to briefly in one of the experiments.
The primary mechanism for differential privacy in the subsequent analysis is the Laplace mechanism. As the query function is defined to be a matrix-valued function, the Laplace mechanism can be applied as follows [31] , [33] :
For a query function f : R M ×N → R P ×V with sensitivity S(f ), the following mechanism is -differentially private:
where Z ∈ R P ×V with z j (i) drawn i.i.d. from Lap(S(f )/ ).
Proof:
The proof can be found in [31] , [33] .
C. Gaussian Model as the Generative Model
In our work, we choose the Gaussian model as the generative model. The Gaussian model is a probabilistic model that assumes that the data are drawn from a Gaussian distribution and the model can be parametrized by the covariance and the mean [10] , [67] . Mathematically, the Gaussian model is represented by the following probability density function:
where Σ is the covariance matrix, µ is the mean, and M is the dimension of x. Thus, to use the Gaussian model as the generative model, only the covariance matrix and the mean are needed.
The multi-variate Gaussian model is a good choice for our application for the following reasons:
• The Gaussian model is arguably as close as we can get to the universal model due to the multi-dimensional Central Limit Theorem [43] . To assert this theorem, we postulate that the database is the result of a sum of many underlying latent/hidden variables, and hence, its distribution approaches Gaussian.
• Many important regimes in data science also assume the Gaussian distribution. Various methods in machine learning follow this assumption, directly or indirectly [10] , [67] ; some practical applications of information theory also consider this assumption [24] ; classical signal processing techniques yield Gaussian error even though they may not explicitly make the assumption [39] .
• Finally, sampling from the Gaussian distribution is straightforward, and there exist many readily available packages to perform the task [17] , [38] , [80] .
For additional in-depth justification of this model, we refer the readers to Rojas [75] .
In spite of these advantages of a Guassian model, we acknowledge that there is no single model that can universally capture all possible databases, and generalizing our approach to other generative models will be an interesting future direction. We demonstrate how to extend our approach to Guassian Mixture Models in Section VI.
D. Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
The dimensionality reduction technique used in this work is PCA. It aims at finding the subspace spanned by the orthonormal components that are the most representative of the data [10] , [56] , [67] .
Definition 3. Given the centered data matrix X ∈ R M ×N , the PCA algorithm aims at finding the projection matrix W ∈ R M ×P with orthonormal columns such that
The solution to the PCA formulation can be derived from the singular value decomposition (SVD) [56] , [57] , and the P eigenvectors with the largest corresponding singular values are chosen to form the projection matrix. This is equivalent to choosing the P components with the highest component powers [56] , [57] . Specifically, using SVD, X can be decomposed as, X = VΛU T , where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the singular values of X. The solution of PCA is then the P column vectors of V with the largest corresponding singular values in Λ.
IV. MOTIVATING DIMENSIONALITY REDUCTION FOR ENHANCING DATA UTILITY
In this section, we discuss how dimensionality reduction can enhance the utility of non-interactive private data release.
Our key insight is that reducing the dimensionality of data can reduce the sensitivity of the differentially private query. For a quantitative understanding of this phenomenon, we first observe that the sensitivity of releasing the database itself is proportional to the dimension and the scale of the data. Second, we contrast dimensionality to scaling by considering how each factor impacts the utility of the data differently via the signalto-noise ratio (SNR).
To simplify the discussion, we assume the query function to be the identity query function, i.e., f (X) = X, and that the Laplace mechanism according to Theorem 1 is used to guarantee -differential privacy. Let us assume further that the value of each feature is bounded such that x(i) ∈ [−a, a], and the sensitivity can thus be computed as follows.
Proposition 1. The sensitivity of the identity function f (X) = X with the assumption that x(i) ∈ [−a, a] is 2M a.
Proof: With the L 1 sensitivity, we have
One observation from the result of Proposition 1 is that it suggests that the amount of Laplacian noise added can be reduced by changing a, i.e., scaling the bounds of the features. It, therefore, may be tempting to state that data utility can be arbitrarily enhanced by simply scaling the feature values. However, as discussed below, this idea is not fertile as one ought to think of the noise added with respect to the value of the utility of interest.
A. Effect of Scaling
Proposition 1 suggests that the sensitivity can be arbitrarily reduced by simply scaling down the data. However, the reality is that by scaling the magnitude of the data, the utility of interest may inadvertently also be reduced. To illustrate such phenomenon, we consider the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) defined for random variables [53] :
Definition 4. Given a signal s, which is deterministic, and a zero-mean noise Z, which is a random variable, the signal-tonoise ratio (SNR) of the measurement s + Z is
where V ar(Z) is the variance of Z.
With respect to a differentially-private mechanism, SNR measures the level of the desired utility of the data relative to the level of noise required for data sanitization.
Theorem 2. Scaling of the feature bounds does not change the SNR of the Laplace mechanism for the identity query function.
Proof: Since the noise according to the Laplace mechanism in Theorem 1 is added independently to each element, the SNR can be considered element-wise. For the [i th , j th ]element,
Theorem 2 suggests that although scaling can make the sensitivity and hence, the noise added, arbitrarily small, it does not provide any useful advantage as the true query value is also scaled down by the same factor. This indicates that scaling may not be the answer to the question of utilizing structural characteristics of data for better differential privacy mechanism design.
B. Effect of Dimensionality Reduction
The proof of Theorem 2 suggests that although scaling may not be beneficial to the design of differential privacy mechanisms, dimensionality reduction may provide such benefits. For further investigation, we define the reduced-dimensioned identity function f : R M ×N → R P ×N where P ≤ M and for notational purposes, let f (X) =X. The sensitivity can be derived accordingly.
Proposition 2. The sensitivity of the reduced-dimensioned identity query function f :
Proof: With the L 1 sensitivity,
With the sensitivity and differential privacy mechanism established, the SNR can be revisited for the reduceddimensioned identity query function as follows. Importantly, this Theorem states that there is a quadratic gain in SNR when dimension is reduced. This consequently indicates that dimensionality reduction can be a viable method for enhancing the utility of non-interactive differentiallyprivate data release. Therefore, we incorporate dimensionality reduction via PCA in our system design presented in the next section.
V. PCA-GAUSS: LEVERAGING PCA ON THE GAUSSIAN MODEL
A. Overview
In this section, we present our system: PCA-Gauss, which leverages the novel combination of PCA and the Gaussian model. The Gaussian model serves as the generative model to synthesize differentially-private data, whereas PCA is employed to enhance the utility of the released data.
PCA-Gauss is designed for universal non-interactive differentially-private data release. Given the ubiquitous use of machine learning for data analysis, it is imperative that PCA-Gauss be able to accommodate important categories of learning tasks such as unsupervised and supervised learning. The main difference between the two is the requirement of the training label (teacher label) in the latter. Crucially, when dimensionality reduction is coupled with a generative model, this additional requirement can be non-trivial, as will be discussed in detail in Section V-D. For this reason, we propose two separate algorithms to implement PCA-Gauss tailored for the each learning task.
• Algorithm 1 for unsupervised learning, i.e. training label is not required (e.g. clustering).
• Algorithm 2 for supervised learning, i.e. training label is required (e.g. regression and classification).
In the subsequent discussion, we present the theoretical basis of PCA-Gauss in detail, and prove that both algorithms preserve -differential privacy. Additionally, in the following sections, we present an extension of PCA-Gauss to Gaussian Mixture Model (Section VI), and to complete the design of PCA-Gauss, we present a simple algorithm for deriving differentially-private PCA (Section VII).
B. Theoretical Basis
1) Differentially-Private Gaussian Model: One of the main theoretical analyses of our work is on how to guarantee differential privacy on the data released from the Gaussian model. The guarantee follows the following induction. The Gaussian model is parametrized by the mean vector and the covariance matrix. Therefore, to guarantee differential privacy on the Gaussian model, it is sufficient to guarantee differential privacy on its two parameters. Then, the post-processing invariant property of differential privacy [29] guarantees that the data synthesized from the differentially-private Gaussian model are also differential-private. Therefore, the task of deriving differentially-private Gaussian model becomes that of deriving differentially-private mean vector and covariance matrix.
In this discussion, we focus our analysis on the covariance matrix. This is because in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we assume the data and model to have zero mean since the data are centered (cf. Section III-A); thus the only parameter needed for the Gaussian model is the covariance matrix.
To compute the covariance matrix from a set of N centered vector-valued samples, {x 1 , . . . , x N }, the maximum likelihood estimator [67] can be used:
Our subsequent discussions on covariance matrix throughout the paper refer to this maximum likelihood estimator. The sensitivity can be computed from this formulation as follows.
Proposition 3. Given a centered training dataset, X ∈ [−a, a] M ×N , the L 1 sensitivity of the maximum likelihood estimate of the covariance matrix is a 2 M 2 /N . Proof: Given neighboring databases X and X ,
Since all entries in X and X are the same except one,
This result shows that, similar to the identity query analyzed in Section IV, the sensitivity of the covariance matrix scales with M 2 .
2) PCA-Induced Features: The main challenge of combining PCA with the Gaussian model is from the observation that when the original features that take the values of [−a, a] are mapped to the PCA-induced features, the scale of the new features may not remain the same. However, in order to evaluate the sensitivity fairly, the sensitivity needs to be compared with respect to the same scale of the features, as illustrated in Section IV-A. For this reason, it is essential to be able to rigorously bound the scale of the PCA-induced features. This is presented by the following Lemma. Proof: Consider a sample,x = W T x, and each PCAinduced feature becomesx(i) = w T i x. Thus, the analysis in one dimension is sufficient to generalize to P dimensions, as each dimension is independent of one another. The range of x(i) can be derived from the solution of the following problem,
This result enables a fair assessment of sensitivity. We can re-scale the PCA-induced features to have the same range of [−a, a] simply by,X norm = W T X/ √ M . In the subsequent analysis, the subscript norm will be omitted for readability, but the readers should always keep in mind that when the PCA-induced feature data are referred to, they are always normalized.
3) Important Linear Algebra Lemma: Finally, the last essential theoretical basis for the privacy analysis of our algorithms is the following linear algebra Lemma. Lemma 2. Given matrices A 1 , A 2 ∈ R M ×M , and let σ 1 (A 1 ) ≥ · · · ≥ σ M (A 1 ), and σ 1 (A 2 ) ≥ · · · ≥ σ M (A 2 ) be the non-increasingly ordered singular values of A 1 and A 2 , respectively. Then,
for each i = 1, . . . , M , where · 2 is the spectral norm.
Proof: See Corollary 7.3.5 in [49] .
C. Unsupervised Learning
Algorithm 1 PCA-Gauss for unsupervised learning Input: centered data matrix X ∈ [−a, a] M ×N , P , and > 0.
from Lap(P a 2 /N ).
5) Sample
private dataset X private from N (0,Σ private ).
Output: X private Algorithm 1 presents the PCA-Gauss algorithm for unsupervised learning. The first three steps of the algorithm are for deriving the PCA-induced covariance estimate from the data. The last two steps make the PCA-induced covariance differentially-private via the Laplace mechanism and synthesize private samples from the Gaussian model, respectively. This algorithm is appropriate for the data-analytic scenarios when the goal is to learn the underlying properties of the data. For example, for a census dataset, a researcher may want to understand how communities are formed based on income, which can be formulated as the clustering problem of unsupervised learning. Next, we present the main privacy theorem for Algorithm 1.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 preserves -differential privacy.
Proof: Algorithm 1 uses the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 1) to guarantee -differential privacy, so the proof is based on the derivation of the sensitivity of the PCA-induced covariance matrix,Σ.
First, the query function is f (X) = 1 M N W T XX T W. Apply SVD [49] on X to get X = VΛU T , with the singular values ordered non-increasingly down the diagonal of Λ. Since the principal components are also derived from SVD of X, it follows that W = V P , where V P indicates the first P columns of V. Substituting in the query function,
M N where Λ P is the diagonal matrix whose diagonals are the P largest singular values of X. Then, the sensitivity can be written as,
Notice that Λ 2 is also the singular values of XX T , so it follows that,
Using the relationship in Lemma 2,
for all i. Since X and X differ by only one column,
Finally, since the sum is up to P , S(f ) = P a 2 /N .
The proof of Theorem 4 provides an affirmation to our premise that dimensionality reduction can significantly reduce the sensitivity of the query. Specifically, using PCA with the Gaussian model according to Algorithm 1 reduces the sensitivity from ∝ M 2 to ∝ P . Hence, the result is particularly attractive when the original data are very high-dimensional as the noise added by the Laplace mechanism in Theorem 1 could be much less. Furthermore, as PCA is optimized for minimum reconstruction error, with an appropriate choice of P , the reduced-dimensioned data should still remain highly representative of the original data, and the gain in sensitivity reduction should outweigh the cost of information loss.
D. Supervised Learning
In supervised learning, the data consist of two parts: the feature data and the training labels. The addition of the training label differentiates this problem from the previous problem of unsupervised learning. As will be presented hereforth, this addition can be non-trivial when dimensionality reduction is coupled with a generative model.
A simple method to incorporate the training label into the covariance matrix is to treat the training label as another feature. However, when PCA is applied, it should only be applied to the feature data, but not to the training label. This is because when PCA is applied, each PCA-induced feature is a linear combination of all original features, and hence, if PCA is also applied to the training label, the integrity of the training label would be ruined. In other words, we may not be able to extract the training label from the PCA-induced data. Thus, to preserve the integrity of the training label, it should not be modified by PCA.
To achieve this design, we first consider the augmented data matrix in the form of X a = X y T , and the augmented covariance matrix becomes,
Then, we apply PCA to only the feature data part of the augmented data matrix and derive the PCA-induced augmented data matrix as,X a = W T X/ √ M y T . Finally, the PCA-induced covariance matrix becomes,
We emphasize again that the dimensionality reduction provided by PCA only acts on the feature data X, but not on the training label y.
Although we can derive the sensitivity of this PCA-induced augmented covariance matrix, the formulation turns out to be such that there is a reduction in sensitivity via PCA only when the number of features (M ) is large relative to the number of samples (N ). Even though this could be applicable in some settings, its usability is undoubtedly limited. We will first precisely illustrate this point in the following Proposition, and will then overcome this limitation. Proof: To prove this Proposition, we derive the sensitivities ofΣ a andΣ a separately.
First, considerΣ a , for neighboring datasets, {X, y}, {X , y },
The sensitivity of the first term is a 2 M 2 /N (cf. Proposition 3). For the last term, since y and y differ by only one element, the sensitivity of the last term is a 2 . For the middle term, the sensitivity is 2 x i y(i) − x i y(i) 1 ≤ 4M a 2 . Thus, the overall sensitivity ofΣ a is S(Σ a ) = (a 2 M 2 + 4M a 2 + a 2 )/N . Next, considerΣ a , for neighboring datasets, {X, y}, {X , y },
The sensitivity of the first term has been derived in Theorem 4. The last term is the same as inΣ a . For the middle term, although {X, y} and {X , y } differ only by one entry, W and W are derived from X and X', respectively, and can possibly be different in every component. Thus, all entries of W T Xy and W T X y can differ, and with Lemma 1, the largest possible difference between each entry is 2P a 2 √ M .
Since there are N entries, the sensitivity of the middle term becomes 4N P a 2 . Therefore, the overall sensitivity ofΣ a is S(Σ a ) = 1 N (P a 2 + 4N P a 2 + a 2 ). Finally, there is reduction in sensitivity only when S(Σ a )/S(Σ a ) < 1. Substitute in the sensitivities and with some algebraic modification, we arrive at the condition presented.
Concisely, this relationship states that there is a gain in sensitivity reduction when P is small, and M is large relative to N . The main reason for this limitation is due to the fact that all of the principal components in W can change even when only one entry of the data matrix changes. Consequently, this results in possible alteration in values of all entries in two sub-matrices of the augmented covariance matrix.
To navigate this challenge, the derivation of the principal components needs to be separated from the derivation of the covariance matrix. Hence, we use an independently-derived PCA in our approach and propose Algorithm 2 for supervised learning. The first step in Algorithm 2 derives the PCAinduced augmented covariance matrix from the data. Then, the subsequent steps make the covariance differentially-private via the Laplace mechanism and synthesize the data, along with their training labels, from the Gaussian model. Regarding the acquisition of independently-derived PCA, there are a few ways to accomplish the task. First, a differentially-private PCA may be used on the entire original dataset (see Section VII, where we propose a simple differentially-private PCA algorithm). The cost of this method is the additional privacy budget to be spent on the differentially-private PCA algorithm based on the serial composition theorem [29] . The second method is to utilize the parallel composition theorem [51] by casting aside a small portion of the dataset for differentially-private PCA algorithm and using the remaining data for covariance matrix. This way, the privacy budget required is only the maximum of the two budgets. The downside of this method, however, is the fact that only small fraction of the data is used to estimate PCA. Alternatively, if there exists a publicly available dataset of the same kind of the private dataset, the principal components can be derived from the public dataset without having to spend any privacy budget on it. This method, although very attractive, is only applicable if such public dataset is available.
Finally, we present the privacy guarantee of Algorithm 2 in the following Theorem.
Theorem 5. Algorithm 2 preserves -differential privacy.
Proof: The proof follows the same deduction as Theorem 4, so we simply need to derive the sensitivity of the PCAinduced augmented covariance matrix with independently derived PCA.
For neighboring datasets, {X, y}, {X , y },
The sensitivity of the first term is derived in Theorem 4, which is P 2 M a 2 /M = P 2 a 2 . The sensitivity of the second term is also similar to that ofΣ a in the proof of Proposition 4 with a different range and dimension ofX. Thus, the sensitivity of the second term is 4P
Note that only the range ofX changes, but not that of y since PCA is not applied to y. Finally, the sensitivity of the last term is derived in Proposition 4 to be a 2 . Therefore, the overall sensitivity is S(f ) = (P 2 a 2 + 4P a 2 + a 2 )/N Noticeably, with independently-derived PCA, there is always a square gain in sensitivity when the dimension is reduced. For a high-dimensional dataset, the gain could be significant, and even if some privacy budget needs to be spent on the differentially-private PCA, the gain in sensitivity could easily outweigh the cost of the extra privacy budget.
VI. EXTENSION TO GAUSSIAN MIXTURE MODEL
Algorithm 2 for supervised learning uses a Gaussian model. Although in many applications, this may be sufficient, e.g. regression, in some applications, it may be beneficial to extend this model to include multiple Gaussian models called Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [10] , [67] . Conceptually, GMM is often used to model data for classification as each Gaussian model can be used to capture the distribution of the data in each class. Thus the entire dataset is modeled by the mixture of these Gaussian models. In fact, many classifiers such as Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [37] , Gaussian Bayes Net [67] , and mixture of Gaussians [67] also rely on this type of generative model, so this GMM extension has historically been proven to be effective for classification. Algorithm 3 illustrates our extension of our PCA-Gauss to GMM. The procedure of the algorithm is as follows. For each class, we model the data in the class by the class covariance and mean. These two parameters for each class are then made differentially private via the Laplace mechanism. Once all models for all classes are derived, they form the differentiallyprivate GMM, which can be used to synthesize the private data. In this algorithm, each data entry is assumed to belong to one class only, so each Gaussian model is derived from a disjoint set of data.
We recommend this algorithm for the classification application. The privacy analysis of this algorithm builds upon that Algorithm 3 PCA-Gauss for supervised learning with GMM Input: centered data matrix X ∈ [−a, a] M ×N , the training label y ∈ {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C L } N , independently-derived PCA: W ∈ R M ×P , and µ , Σ > 0. 1. for C in {C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C L } do 1) Form X C , whose N C column vectors are all samples in class C. Proof: First, consider data in a single class. There are two parameters derived from the data: the class covariance and the class mean. Both are made differentially-private by the Laplace mechanism (Theorem 1), so we need to derive their respective sensitivities.
(1) Consider the L 1 sensitivity of the PCA-induced class mean (with independently-derived PCA). The PCA-induced class mean isμ C = 1
(2) Next, consider the PCA-induced class covariance (with independently-derived PCA). For neighboring datasets,
. This is merely the first term in the proof in Theorem 5, so the sensitivity is P 2 M a 2 /N M = P 2 a 2 /N . Second, since both the covariance and mean of each class are derived from the same set of data, the budgets add up due to serial composition [29] , and, hence, the ( µ + Σ ) guarantee for each class.
Finally, consider the data in all classes. Since each data sample can belong to only one class, data are partitioned disjointly into each class. Hence, the privacy budgets used for each class do not add up due to parallel composition [51] .
It is clear from the sensitivity derivation of both the class covariance and the class mean that there is a quadratic and linear reduction in sensitivity respectively, when dimension is reduced.
VII. SIMPLE DIFFERENTIALLY-PRIVATE PCA ALGORITHM (LAP-PCA)
Since Algorithm 2 and 3 utilize an independently-derived PCA, we propose a simple differentially-private PCA algorithm for completeness of our system. Although there have been proposals for differentially-private PCA algorithms, e.g. [14] , [21] , [34] , Proposition 3 and Theorem 1 together can be used for a simple differentially-private PCA algorithm as follows (Lap-PCA).
1) Derive the covariance matrix,Σ from the centered data according to Equation (2).
3) Compute SVD ofΣ private , and output the P largest eigenvectors from SVD.
The following Theorem provides the privacy guarantee for this PCA algorithm.
Theorem 7. PCA derived from the SVD of the -differentiallyprivate covariance matrix is -differentially private.
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 3 and Theorem 1, and the post-processing invariance property of differential privacy [29] .
VIII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we experimentally validate the effectiveness of our proposed framework.
• We demonstrate that PCA-Gauss is effective across a range of datasets and machine learning tasks. For the datasets, we use a facial expression dataset [27] , a sensor displacement dataset [6] , [8] , and a social media dataset [54] . For the machine learning tasks, we use applications based on clustering, classification, and regression.
• Our experiments validate our theoretical analysis that reducing the dimensionality of data can significantly increase the utility of differentially-private data release.
• We show the effectiveness of our novel combination of PCA and the Gaussian generative model via experimental comparison with five previous approaches that solely relied on either dimensionality reduction, or generative models. Table I summarizes the setups of our experiments, and we discuss them in detail in the subsequent sections.
A. Datasets

1) Grammatical Facial Expression dataset (GFE) [27]:
This dataset is based on automatic facial expression analysis from video images, and has 27,936 samples and 301 features. There are multiple clusters based on different grammatical facial expressions under Libras (a Brazilian sign language). We thus use this dataset for the privacy-preserving clustering study on Algorithm 1.
Exp.
Dataset
Training Size 2) Realistic Sensor Displacement dataset (Realdisp) [6] , [8] : This is a mobile-sensing dataset used for activity recognition. The features include readings of various motion sensors such as accelerometer and gyroscope, and the goal is to identify the activity being performed from these sensors. The dataset consists of 216,752 training samples, and 1,290 testing samples with 117 features. In our experiments, we use this dataset for the privacy-preserving classification study with Algorithm 3. Specifically, we formulate it as a binary classification -identifying whether the subject is performing an action that causes a location displacement or not, e.g. walking, running, cycling, etc.
3) Buzz in Social Media dataset (Twitter) [54] : This dataset extracts 77 features from Twitter posts and tries to predict the popularity level of the topic. The dataset is divided into the training set of 573,820 samples, and the testing set of 4,715 samples. We use this dataset for privacy-preserving regression, and adopt Algorithm 2 for the experiments.
B. Setups
For all experiments, the data are scaled to the range of [−1, 1], and since all of the experiments involve random sampling of synthetic data, we perform 100 trials of each experiment and report the average, along with the 95% confidence interval.
1) Clustering Setup:
Since clustering is an unsupervised learning task, we apply Algorithm 1. We use K-Means [10] , [56] , [67] , [71] as the clustering algorithm, and the Silhouette Coefficient (S.C.) [77] as the evaluation metric. Silhouette Coefficient is defined as follows.
For the sample x i assigned to class y(i),
• let a(i) be the average euclidean distance between x i and all other samples assigned to the same class y(i)
• let b(i) be the average euclidean distance between x i and all points assigned to the next nearest class.
define sc(i) = b(i)−a(i) max{b(i),a(i)} , and the Silhouette Coefficient is defined as,
Intuitively, S.C. measures the average distance between the sample and its class mean, normalized by the distance to the next nearest class mean. It takes the values of [−1, 1], where the higher the number, the better the performance.
We pick this metric for two main reasons. First, as opposed to other metrics such as ACC [89] , adjusted rand index [50] , or V-measure [76] , S.C. does not require the knowledge of the ground truth. This is vital both for our evaluation and for real-world applications, respectively because the ground truth is not available for the synthetic data in our evaluation, and it is often not available in practice too. Second, as suggested by Rousseeuw [77] , S.C. depends primarily on the distribution of the data, but less on the clustering algorithm used, so it is appropriate for the evaluation of non-interactive private data release methods.
2) Classification Setup: For classification, we employ the Gaussian Mixture Model according to Algorithm 3. Since independently-derived PCA is used by the algorithm, we implement the algorithm with three sources of independentlyderived PCA. The first two sources are based on two differentially-private PCA algorithms performed on the entire private training data:
• Lap-PCA: -differentially-private algorithm proposed in Section VII
• AG-PCA: ( , δ)-differentially-private algorithm called Analyze Gauss [34] .
Additionally, to emulate a scenario where a small public dataset may be available for derivation of PCA, we cast aside a small disjoint portion of 600 samples as the public dataset (Pub-PCA). Again, we emphasize that the public dataset is only used for Pub-PCA, but not for Lap-PCA and AG-PCA.
Recall that Algorithm 3 requires µ and Σ for the class mean and class covariance, respectively, to preserve Gauss = µ + Σ differential privacy of the generative model (i.e. GMM). We allocate the privacy budget as follows.
We set this ratio because the class mean naturally has a much lower sensitivity, so it can still be accurately estimated with a small budget.
Furthermore, when Lap-PCA and AG-PCA are applied, there is a need for an additional P CA privacy budget (and δ P CA for AG-PCA) for the derivation of private PCA. In all classification experiments with the total budget of = P CA + Gauss , we allocate the budget such that, We use α = {1, 2, . . . , 10} × 10 −1 and report the best result for each method. For AG-PCA, we set δ P CA = 1/N . Finally, the support vector machine (SVM) [23] , [71] is used as the classifier in all experiments.
3) Regression Setup:
We use Algorithm 2 for regression. Since independently-derived PCA is required, we use PCA derived from the three sources similar to the classification setup. The public dataset (used only for Pub-PCA) consists of 4,715 samples. For all regression experiments, the privacy budget allocation between P CA and Gauss is the same as in classification, i.e. P CA = α and Gauss = (1 − α) , where α = {1, 2, . . . , 10} × 10 −1 . When required, we set δ P CA = 1/N . Kernel Ridge Regression (KRR) [56] , [71] is employed as the regression algorithm, and the root-mean-square error (RMSE) [10] , [56] is used as the evaluation metric. Finally, for comparison, we also provide a random-guess baseline of which prediction is drawn i.i.d. from a uniform distribution.
4) Comparison to Other Methods:
To provide context to the experimental results, we compare our approach to five previous works and a non-private baseline method to signify the merit of our approach. The compared methods are as follows.
1) Real data: the non-private baseline approach, where the result is obtained from the real data without any modification. 2) Li et al. [60] : the method based on dimensionality reduction via Bernoulli random projection on the identity query. 3) Jiang et al. [52] : the method based on PCA/LDA on the identity query (LDA is only applicable to binary classification). 4) Blum et al. [15] : exponential mechanism for noninteractive setting. 5) Liu [62] : parametrized generative model without dimensionality reduction. 6) Our adaptation of Blocki et al. [12] : the method based on the covariance query with Gaussian random projection, with our extension to the non-interactive setting via our Gaussian model. 1 1 The random projection on the covariance matrix as proposed by Blocki et al. [12] is actually performed on the column of X, i.e. they actually perform "sample reduction" rather than feature dimensionality reduction like we do. Gaussian Gauss. Rand. We compare PCA-Gauss to these six methods for the following reasons. The first comparison is to show the real-world usability of our method. The second and third comparisons are to motivate the use of the Gaussian model over the identity query while the remaining comparisons are to motivate dimensionality reduction via PCA.
For all of the previous methods, we use the parameters suggested by the authors of the method, and we vary the free variable, e.g. dimension, before reporting the best performance. 2 Finally, for the method by Li et al. [60] , we derive PCA and LDA (only applicable to binary classification) from the public dataset (Pub-PCA and Pub-LDA) for the best performance.
C. Experimental Results
For methods with dimensionality reduction, the results reported are the best results among varied dimensions in the experiments.
1) Privacy-Preserving Clustering: Table II summarizes the results for clustering, and the following are main observations. • Compared to the non-private baseline (real data), PCA-Gauss yields only 0.06 additional error while preserving strong privacy ( = 1.0).
• Compared to Li et al. [60] and Jiang et al. [52] , who use the identity query as opposed to the Gaussian model, PCA-Gauss has over 2x better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to Blum et al. [15] and Liu [62] , who do not use dimensionality reduction, PCA-Gauss has over 3x and 2x better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to our adaptation of Blocki et al. [12] , which use Gaussian random projection as opposed to PCA, PCA-Gauss has 4x better utility with the stronger privacy guarantee.
2) Privacy-Preserving Classification: Table III summarizes the classification results, and the following are main observations.
• Compared to the non-private baseline (real data), PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA yields only ∼ 6% additional error while preserving strong privacy ( = 1.0).
• Compared to Li et al. [60] and Jiang et al. [52] , who use the identity query as opposed to GMM, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has over 10% better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to Blum et al. [15] and Liu [62] , who do not use dimensionality reduction, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has over 15% better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to our adaptation of Blocki et al. [12] , which use Gaussian random projection as opposed to PCA, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has over 15% better utility with the stronger privacy guarantee.
• When public data are not used, using Lap-PCA/AG-PCA with PCA-Gauss yields additional 2% and 5% error, respectively, to using public data. Nevertheless, PCA-Gauss with Lap-PCA/AG-PCA still outperforms all prior works with the same total privacy budget.
Additionally, we point out that if larger privacy budget is allowed, PCA-Gauss can give performance even closer to the non-private baseline. For instance, with = 3.0, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has a classification accuracy of 79.09 ± 0.51%, resulting in only 3.5% loss in utility from the non-private baseline.
3) Privacy-Preserving Regression: Table IV summarizes the results for regression, and the following are main observations.
• Compared to the non-private baseline (real data), PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA actually performs statistically equally well, while preserving strong privacy ( = 1.0).
• Compared to Li et al. [60] and Jiang et al. [52] , who use the identity query as opposed to the Gaussian model, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has over 200x better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to Blum et al. [15] and Liu [62] , who do not use dimensionality reduction, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has over 200x and 5x better utility with the same privacy budget.
• Compared to our adaptation of Blocki et al. [12] , which use Gaussian random projection as opposed to PCA, PCA-Gauss with Pub-PCA has 200x better utility with the stronger privacy guarantee.
• When public data are not used, using Lap-PCA/AG-PCA with PCA-Gauss yields only additional 3 × 10 −4 and 2 × 10 −4 RMSE, respectively. More importantly, PCA-Gauss with Lap-PCA/AG-PCA still outperforms all prior works with the same total privacy budget, and still performs almost equally as well as the non-private baseline. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of dimensionality reduction on the utility of the three tasks across various privacy budgets. Notably, there is polynomial gain in utility when dimension is reduced in all three tasks, confirming the SNR observation in Section IV-B. This general trend is also consistent across different privacy budgets. The gain in utility of the synthesized data verifies the benefit of dimensionality reduction for non-interactive private data release, which is the main claim of this work.
4) Effect of Dimension on Utility Performance:
5) Summary of Experimental Results:
Overall, PCA-Gauss outperforms all five other methods in terms of utility across all three learning tasks. PCA-Gauss also performs comparably well relative to the maximum utility achieved by the nonprivate baseline in all three tasks. The main results are concluded as follows.
• PCA-Gauss provides performance close to that attainable from the non-private real data.
• Using the Gaussian model over the identity query has been shown to provide utility gain of over 2x, 10%, and 200x for clustering, classification, and regression, respectively.
• Using dimensionality reduction has been shown to provide utility gain of over 3x, 15%, and 200x for clustering, classification, and regression, respectively.
• Using Lap-PCA/AG-PCA, instead of the public dataset (Pub-PCA), PCA-Gauss still outperforms all other methods, and incurs only a small additional loss in utility (2% loss in classification, and 2 × 10 −4 additional RMSE in regression) over using Pub-PCA.
IX. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORKS
A. Sensitivity Gain vs Information Loss
The sensitivity gain from reducing the dimension of data comes with a cost of information loss. We note that (1) PCA is optimized to minimize the amount of information loss, and (2) the cost of information loss is small in comparison to the gain in sensitivity, which is in the order of dimension squared. This observation is confirmed by our experimental results, as the best results often occur at the lowest dimensions.
One way to quantify the sensitivity gain and information loss is to consider the sensitivity-gain-to-informationloss ratio (SIR). This ratio is defined as follows. First, as suggested by Kung [56] , the information loss due to dimensionality reduction via PCA can be measured as IL(P ) = Σ M i=1 σ i (Σ)/Σ P i=1 σ i (Σ), where σ i (Σ) is the singular value of the i th principal component (cf. Section III-D). On the other hand, the sensitivity gain can be computed as, SG(P ) = S(f, M )/S(f, P ) -where S(f, M ) and S(f, P ) are the sensitivities at full dimension, and at dimension P , respectively. Therefore, the SIR can be defined as, SIR(P ) = SG(P )/IL(P ) At full dimension, SIR is one, indicating no gain in sensitivity with respect to the loss in information. As the dimension decreases, SIR>1 indicates that the sensitivity gain outweighs the information loss, and vice-versa. As an example, Figure 2 plots SIR derived from the GFE dataset. Notably, SIR is significantly greater than one, so the gain is considerably greater than the loss as the dimension decreases, confirming our premise that dimensionality reduction should be beneficial despite some small information loss.
B. Acquiring Independently-Derived PCA Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 utilize an independentlyderived PCA. In our regression and classification experiments, we show three sources of independently-derived PCA -from Lap-PCA, from AG-PCA, and from the public data. All three sources of PCA outperform other methods in all experiments, confirming the merit of PCA-Gauss. For the latter approach of using the public data as a source of PCA (instead of Lap-PCA or AG-PCA), the following question arises: if there exists a public dataset, why not simply train the model from it?
To answer this question, we first point out that, in our experiments, the size of the public dataset is very small compared to the size of the private training dataset. Specifically, the ratios between the public and private datasets are 0.0028 and 0.0082 for classification and regression, respectively. According to the empirical risk minimization (ERM) principle, it has been proven in the seminal work by Vapnik and Chervonenkis [83] that larger training sample size is crucial for the predictive power of machine learning algorithms. Hence, there is a strong motivation to utilize the larger-sized private training data. Furthermore, to stress this point empirically, we also run our classification and regression experiments by training the models only on the public data, and the results are 62.71% accuracy and 0.07 RMSE, respectively, which clearly are much worse than the results from PCA-Gauss.
C. Other Dimensionality Reduction Techniques and Generative Models
Future works could consider other dimensionality reduction techniques and generative models. Examples of other dimensionality reduction techniques include Discriminant Component Analysis (DCA) [19] , [56] , [57] for classification; Latent Dirichlet Allocation [11] for discrete-valued data; Factor Analysis (FA) [67] for non-isotropic noise; and kernel PCA [79] for non-linear dimensionality reduction.
One alternative application-independent generative model is the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) [67] . KDE is a general non-parametric method that uses the training data to derive the probability density function with respect to a predefined similarity function. Once KDE learns from the training data, it can be made differentially private by adding the Laplace noise to the output of the KDE function. However, since KDE is non-parametric, implementing a sampling algorithm for private KDE could be challenging or computationally expensive.
X. CONCLUSION
In this work, we combine two previously non-intersecting techniques -dimensionality reduction and generative model -to provide a solution to the challenging problem of noninteractive private data release.
We propose the PCA-Gauss system and present three simple algorithms to implement it both for unsupervised and supervised learning. We rigorously prove that all three of our algorithms provide the -differential privacy guarantee. Finally, our experiments on three real-world datasets under clustering, classification, and regression applications show great promise of the method. PCA-Gauss provides upto an order of magnitude performance improvement over previous state-of-the-art approaches. Thus, PCA-Gauss can be a key enabler for the real-world deployment of privacy-preserving data release.
